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INTRODUCTION
International law has long considered the regulation of abortion
to be a prerogative of the State. In recent years, however, international
human rights bodies have begun to consider the conformity of
domestic abortion regulations with States’ human rights obligations.
This Article identifies and examines a notable trend among human
rights bodies: namely, their willingness to find that denying or
obstructing a woman’s access to abortion can amount to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment (“CIDT”) under multiple human
rights treaties. This Article identifies two lines of reasoning emerging
from human rights bodies in this area. First, human rights bodies have
found that States can be responsible for cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment inflicted on women who are harassed and denied services
that are legally available to them under the State’s laws. Second,
human rights bodies have found that the application of restrictive
abortion laws themselves may inflict CIDT by depriving women of an
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abortion in cases such as rape or when the woman’s life or health is
seriously threatened.
I argue that these findings reflect an understanding that certain
restrictions on abortion—or the State’s failure to act to prevent de
facto restrictions—are unjustifiable and disproportionate to lawful
State aims. They also demonstrate a limited but important recognition
that deprivations of autonomy in the reproductive rights context can
lead to the kind of pain and suffering that is unacceptable in modern
societies. At the same time, I argue that human rights bodies should
further strengthen their understanding of women’s autonomy interests
in this context, particularly the ways in which the frustration of
women’s reproductive autonomy can inflict severe and unacceptable
pain or suffering tantamount to CIDT. Such recognition, I argue, is
essential to ensuring that women’s human rights are fully recognized
and protected in the context of reproductive health and reproductive
decision-making.
The prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment is one of the most well established obligations under
international law. While traditionally associated with extreme
physical or psychological abuse committed against detainees by State
actors in State-run facilities, the concept of torture and CIDT has
expanded significantly in the past two decades, along with the
justifications for holding a State responsible under international law
for the commission of such acts. Torture and CIDT are increasingly
viewed as acts that occur not only within State detention but also in
everyday settings—from public and private healthcare facilities to the
home. Human rights bodies have found violations of the right to be
free from torture or CIDT in many cases of violence that were once
considered outside the scope of the prohibition, including rape,1
domestic violence,2 coercive sterilization,3 female genital mutilation,4
1. See, e.g., Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 23718/94 (1997) (acknowledging for the
first time that an act of rape could constitute torture); Raquel Martí de Mejía v. Peru, Case
10.970, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.91, doc. 7 (1996). See
generally ALICE EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 219–29 (2011) (analyzing human rights standards on rape and torture)
[hereinafter EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN]; Felice D. Gaer, Rape as a Form of
Torture: The Experience of the Committee Against Torture, 15 N.Y. CITY. L. REV. 293 (2012);
Clare McGlynn, Rape, Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights, 58 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 565 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Eremia v. Moldova, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 3564/11, ¶¶ 48–66 (2013) (applying
Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to
a case of domestic violence); Opuz v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 158–76 (2009)

102

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:99

and corporal punishment of children.5 Furthermore, while state
responsibility for acts of torture or CIDT traditionally attached only
when the act was committed by State agents or those under their
control, human rights bodies today recognize that States may be held
responsible—and accountable—for acts of torture or CIDT
committed by private actors when the State has failed to take
appropriate steps to prevent and punish these acts.6 These changes
have set the stage for a recent and novel development in this area of
human rights law: namely the recognition that, in certain
circumstances, acts by public or private individuals to deny or
obstruct a woman’s access to abortion can cause such severe pain or
suffering that they amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,
triggering state responsibility under international law.
International law has long considered the regulation of abortion
to be an area of domestic concern and a prerogative, at least to some
extent, of the State. While the European Court of Human Rights has a
long-standing jurisprudence on abortion, primarily under Article 8—
(same); Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by
States Parties, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008). See generally Rhonda Copelon,
Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 291 (1993–1994).
3. See, e.g., I.G. & others. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 15966/04, ¶¶ 112–26 (2013);
N.B. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 29518/10, ¶¶ 71–88 (2012); V.C. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct.
H.R. No. 18968/07, ¶¶ 100–20 (2012); Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of
the Committee Against Torture: Slovakia, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SVK/CO/2 (2009); Comm.
Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Peru, ¶
23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/PER/CO/4 (2006); Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and
Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Czech Republic, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/CR/32/2 (2004); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Slovakia, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/SVK (2003); Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men and
Women), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000) [hereinafter HRC, General
Comment No. 28]; Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations by the Human Rights
Committee: Peru, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/PER (2000); Human Rights Comm.,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Japan, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.102 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against
Torture: Indonesia, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/IDN/CO/2 (2008); Comm. Against Torture,
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Kenya, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/KEN/CO/1 (2008); HRC, General Comment No. 28, supra note 3, ¶ 11.
5. See, e.g., A. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25599/94 (1998) (finding that a minor
who was repeatedly caned with force by his stepfather had experienced inhuman or degrading
treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
6. See infra Part I.B; see also EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 1, at
237–52 (describing the development of a “due diligence” standard in human rights law to hold
States accountable for acts of torture or CIDT committed by private actors).
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right to private life—of the European Convention on Human Rights,7
it has only been in the last ten to fifteen years that other human rights
bodies have begun to consider the legality of domestic abortion
regulations under a State’s human rights obligations.8 These bodies
have not found an explicit “right to choose” in human rights law, but
have concluded that certain restrictions or barriers to accessing
abortion may seriously undermine a woman’s human rights, including
her rights to life, health, privacy, and non-discrimination, and that
fulfillment of the associated right may therefore require reforms to
domestic laws.9
Framing acts that deny or obstruct women’s access to abortion as
forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is part of a decadeslong effort by feminist scholars and advocates to advance
international recognition of female-specific forms of pain and

7. The now-defunct European Commission on Human Rights first considered whether
domestic abortion regulations violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
in 1976. See Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, App No. 6959/75, 3
Eur. Comm’n H.R. 244, ¶¶ 61–63 (1976).
8. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (“ICPD”) played
a significant role in putting reproductive rights on the international human rights agenda. In
fact, the ICPD Programme of Action, adopted at the 1994 conference, was the first
international consensus documents in which States agreed that reproductive rights were human
rights already recognized in domestic and international law. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION
FUND (UNFPA), INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
adopted Sept. 1994, at 60, ¶ 7.3, available at http://www.unfpa.org/publications/internationalconference-population-and-development-icpd-programme-action. For an overview of how
human rights bodies have addressed the intersection of abortion and human rights, see HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, DECISIONS DENIED: WOMEN’S ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVES AND
ABORTION
IN
ARGENTINA,
66
(June
2005),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/argentina0605/argentina0605.pdf (noting in 2005 that UN
Treaty Monitoring Bodies had “produced a significant body of jurisprudence regarding
abortion in over 122 concluding observations concerning at least ninety-three countries”);
Center for Reproductive Rights, Bringing Rights to Bear: Abortion and Human Rights (2008),
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/
crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/BRB_abortion_hr_revised_3.09_WEB.PDF.
9. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Commc'n No.
22/2009, L.C. v. Peru, 17 Oct. 2011, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 (2011) (finding that
under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, Peru
was obligated to amend its laws to allow women to obtain abortion in cases of rape and sexual
assault, establish a mechanism to ensure the availability of those services, and guarantee
access to abortion when a woman’s life or health is in danger); Human Rights Comm.,
Commc'n. No. 1153/2003, K.L. v. Peru, 24 Oct. 2005, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003
(2005); HRC, General Comment No. 28, supra note 3, ¶ 10; Comm. on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Senegal, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62 (2001).
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suffering as serious human rights violations.10 In particular, feminist
scholars have critiqued the prohibition on torture and CIDT as being
largely constructed on the basis of a male paradigm—that of
“interrogating, punishing or intimidating detainees,” generally
male11—and for ignoring the contexts in which women experience
comparable pain or suffering. By analyzing women’s experiences as
forms of torture or CIDT, scholars and advocates have attempted to
reorient the concept to “encompass those forms of violations of
dignity and physical integrity that are most relevant to the lived
experiences of women.”12 Given that the prohibition on CIDT is a
non-derogable right13 and potentially a jus cogens norm,14 framing
women’s experiences of pain or suffering as forms of CIDT
highlights the imperative of addressing women’s suffering as a human
rights issue and demands greater accountability from States for their
role in such suffering.15

10. See RONLI SIFRIS, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, TORTURE AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGING THE MASCULINISATION OF TORTURE 19–23 (2014). The
efforts of human rights advocates to frame denial of abortion as a form of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment—or even torture in particularly severe cases—follows a line of thinking
put forward by international feminist scholars in the 1990s who argued that rape was
sufficiently severe to amount to torture. See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, On Torture: A
Feminist Perspective on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 7 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993); Hilary
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International
Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 628–30 (1991).
11. SIFRIS, supra note 10, at 19.
12. Id. at 10.
13. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (prohibiting derogations from Article 7); see also Human
Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) (noting that
Article 7 of the ICCPR cannot be limited, even by public emergency, extenuating
circumstances, or orders from a public authority). The European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) has held that the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, regardless of the conduct of the victim, the
nature of the offense, or the existence of a threat to national security. See D. v. United
Kingdom, 30240/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 47 (1997); see also CAT, General Comment No. 2, supra
note 2, ¶¶ 5–6.
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
cmts. d-i, §102 cmt. k (1987); see also Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 331 (2009).
15. For example, Catharine MacKinnon has noted that relying on the “recognized
profile” of torture could advance women’s rights because torture carries effective legal
sanctions and penalties. See EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 1, at 212
(citing MacKinnon, On Torture, supra note 10, at 25).
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Human rights bodies have become increasingly receptive to
claims that denying or obstructing a woman’s access to abortion—or
related services that are legal prerequisites for abortion16—amounts to
CIDT in a number of circumstances. Yet there has been little critical
assessment of these emerging standards or attempts to understand
how human rights bodies evaluate the pain or suffering that women
experience when they are denied an abortion. This Article seeks to fill
that gap. Part I begins by providing an overview of the prohibition
against CIDT in international human rights law as well as State
obligations to prevent, punish, and redress victims for such violations
of their human rights. Part II examines a number of cases, individual
communications, and other standard-setting documents, such as
Concluding Observations to States, in which human rights bodies
have addressed the nexus between denying a woman access to an
abortion and the infliction of CIDT. I identify two key trends in this
area. First, human rights bodies, particularly the European Court of
Human Rights, have concluded in several cases that CIDT can arise in
situations where women are denied access to, or are obstructed in,
their attempts to obtain abortions or related health services that are
legally available to them under domestic law. In these cases, human
rights bodies have not recognized a substantive right to access
abortion under international law, but have urged States to address a
procedural deficit in their own laws that make women vulnerable to
abuse while seeking an abortion.17 Second, the UN Human Rights
Committee and the UN Committee Against Torture—two UN Treaty
Monitoring Bodies18—have found that States have an international
legal obligation to reform particularly restrictive abortion laws or risk
16. See infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of R.R. v. Poland and efforts to deny the
applicant prenatal genetic testing, a prerequisite to obtaining a legal abortion in cases of fetal
impairment in Poland.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. The UN Human Rights Committee is a body of independent experts created by States
parties’ agreement in the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 28. The U.N. Committee
Against Torture is a body of independent experts created by States parties’ agreement in the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 17, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
CAT]. Both Committees monitor State compliance with their respective treaty, provide
authoritative interpretations of their treaty, and, under optional protocols, are empowered to
hear individual communications on alleged violations of the ICCPR and the CAT. See UNITED
NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: INTRODUCTION, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited May 1, 2014); UNITED NATIONS,
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/CATIntro.aspx
(last visited May 1, 2014).
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inflicting CIDT on women when these laws are applied, including in
cases of rape or incest, when a woman’s life is at stake, or when the
fetus is severely deformed.19
While these human rights bodies have acknowledged the nexus
between CIDT and the denial of abortion in different ways, I observe
in Part III that they appear to rely on similar underlying
considerations in finding that denying or obstructing a woman’s
access to abortion amounts to CIDT. First, I argue that human rights
bodies may engage in an implicit “justifiability” threshold test to
determine whether the infliction of pain or suffering resulting from a
State’s abortion regulations is proportionate to the achievement of a
lawful State aim—and thus is a justifiable regulation that does not
inflict CIDT. Second, human rights bodies have focused on the
presence of “autonomy deficits”—such as youth, diminished mental
capacity, or sexual violence—that compromise a woman’s ability to
consent to the sex that leads to her pregnancy. In this view, a
woman’s pain and suffering stems not only from being compelled to
continue with a pregnancy that she does not want but also from the
violation of her own bodily integrity. Additionally, human rights
bodies give particular consideration to the presence of “maternal
suffering,” or heightened pain stemming from the woman’s fear that
her fetus will be born with an abnormality that will cause it suffering.
Finally, I argue that human rights bodies would benefit from
developing a stronger understanding of the autonomy interests that
are implicated by a woman’s decision to have an abortion and the
pain or suffering she may experience when that autonomy is
frustrated. Further incorporating women’s autonomy interests into the
CIDT analysis would be an important step forward in strengthening
international legal protections for women’s reproductive rights.
I. CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
In this Part, I outline the elements of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment under international human rights law as well as
the ways in which state responsibility attaches for these violations. I
focus on the understanding of CIDT under the treaty regimes
discussed in Part II, namely the European Convention on Human

19. See infra Part II.B.
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Rights (“ECHR”),20 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”),21 and the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).22
A. Establishing the Level of Suffering Required for CIDT
The CAT, ICCPR, and ECHR treaty regimes all recognize that
CIDT involves acts that inflict severe physical or mental23 suffering
on the victim. Determining whether the minimum level of suffering
has been met is a fact-specific inquiry, and human rights bodies
consider both objective and subjective factors in making this
determination.24 Both the European Court of Human Rights and the
Human Rights Committee have noted that they consider all the
circumstances of the case in their analysis, such as “the duration of
the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the
sex, age and state of health of the victim.”25 Additionally, the level of
suffering required to constitute CIDT may change over time. The
European Court has acknowledged that, under an “evolutive
interpretation” of the European Convention on Human Rights, an act
that at one time was deemed to be a form of inhuman or degrading
treatment might in the future be classified as torture due to changes in
the social context.26 This principle suggests that acts once considered
not to meet the threshold of suffering for CIDT could come to be

20. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter ECHR].
21. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 7.
22. See CAT, supra note 18, arts. 1, 16.
23. The Convention Against Torture explicitly acknowledges that mental suffering may
amount to torture or CIDT. Id. art. 1. Furthermore, both the European Court and the Human
Rights Committee have interpreted the ECHR and the ICCPR, respectively, to cover
psychological torture and CIDT. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No.
5310/71, ¶ 167 (1978); Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, supra note 13, ¶
5.
24. See Manfred Nowak, Torture and Enforced Disappearance, in INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 151, 155 (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009).
25. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5310/71, ¶ 162 (1978); see also Fehér
v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 69095/10, ¶ 18 (2013); Vuolanne v. Finland, U.N. Human
Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 265/1987, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) (1989).
26. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GER. L.J. 1731 (2011) (describing the use of
evolutive interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights); accord Selmouni v. France,
Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 25803/94, ¶ 101 (1999). Other human rights bodies have also used dynamic
interpretive techniques. See Birgit Schlütter, Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation by the
UN Treaty Bodies, in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 261, 282
(Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012).
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recognized as CIDT over time as societal understandings change.27 In
short, there is no hard and fast test for determining when conduct rises
to the level of CIDT; instead, human rights bodies will consider the
treatment in light of the physical and mental impact on the victim and
the social and political circumstances.
Human rights bodies further distinguish between cruel/inhuman
treatment and degrading treatment, based on whether the conduct
severely humiliates the victim. The European Court of Human Rights
has defined degrading treatment as conduct that humiliates and
debases the victim, either in his own eyes or in the eyes of others.28
Intent to humiliate the victim is not required under the European
Court’s jurisprudence;29 conduct that inflicts a minimum level of
humiliation and discloses a “callous disregard for [the victim’s]
vulnerability and distress” can be enough to constitute degrading
treatment.30 Further, under the Convention Against Torture, acts
aimed at humiliating the victim constitute degrading treatment,
regardless of whether severe pain is inflicted.31
Finally, human rights bodies often define CIDT by
distinguishing it from torture. In part, this distinction is based on the
severity of the pain, suffering, or humiliation inflicted on the victim,
with a higher threshold of suffering needed for an act to amount to
torture. However, torture may also be distinguished by the presence of
a particular mens rea that is not generally considered necessary for a
finding of CIDT. The Convention Against Torture, for example,
requires that torture be intentionally inflicted for one of several
impermissible purposes,32 but does not require either intentional
27. See CORNELIS WOLFRAM WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE
PROTECTION FROM REFOULMENT 9 (2009), available at https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/
bitstream/handle/1887/13756/000-wouters-B-25-02-2009.pdf?sequence=2
(discussing
evolutive interpretation of human rights treaties).
28. See, e.g., Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 7511/76, ¶ 28
(1982); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5856/72, ¶¶ 30, 32 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Peers v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 28524/95, ¶¶ 74–75 (2001) (holding that
the authorities’ failure to improve unacceptable prison conditions for a patient with a
psychiatric condition demonstrated an objective “lack of respect for the applicant” and thus
constituted degrading treatment, despite the fact that there was no “positive intention of
humiliating or debasing the applicant”).
30. R.R. v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶ 151 (2011); Campbell & Cosans v.
United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 7511/76, ¶ 28 (1982).
31. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of
Torture, Manfred Nowak, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6 (Dec. 23, 2005).
32. These impermissible purposes include but are not necessarily limited to: obtaining
information or a confession; punishing a person for an act that the victim or a third person
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infliction or the presence of an impermissible purpose for CIDT.
Instead, the Committee Against Torture’s CIDT analysis focuses on
the level of pain, suffering, or humiliation inflicted on the victim.33
The European Court of Human Rights similarly defines torture as
inhuman treatment that is both deliberate and “causing very serious
and cruel suffering,”34 while noting that inhuman or degrading
treatment is conduct that, while still serious, falls below that
threshold.35 The Human Rights Committee, in contrast, does not
focus on the intent or purpose of the perpetrator in distinguishing
between torture and CIDT but instead engages in a holistic evaluation
of the treatment in question.36
In sum, across human rights regimes, CIDT analysis focuses on
the level of suffering inflicted on the victim, measured in both
subjective and objective terms. If a human rights body does not deem
the conduct to be sufficiently severe, it will not be considered to have
crossed the threshold into CIDT, even if pain or discomfort has been
inflicted. The inquiry tends to be fact and context specific, and human
rights bodies’ understanding of what conduct constitutes CIDT may
evolve over time.
B. Establishing State Responsibility for CIDT: Actions of State
Officials and the Requirement of Due Diligence
Even if conduct reaches the level of severity necessary to
constitute CIDT, it may not amount to a violation of international law
unless the conduct is attributable in some way to the State. States bear
international responsibility for CIDT in two ways: through the direct
acts or omissions of their officials or by failing to exercise due

committed or is suspected of committing; intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person;
for “any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” CAT, supra note 18, art. 1(1).
33. See Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 10; Report of
the Special Rapporteur, supra note 31, ¶ 35 (“Acts which fall short of [the definition of
torture], particularly acts without the elements of intent or acts not carried out for the specific
purposes outlined, may comprise CIDT under article 16 of the Convention.”).
34. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5310/71, ¶ 167 (1978).
35. See id.; INTERIGHTS, PROHIBITION OF TORTURE, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 14–
22 (2008), available at http://www.interights.org/files/105/Article%203%20Manual%
20Final%20March%202009.pdf.
36. HRC, General Comment No. 20, supra note 13, ¶ 4 (noting that the distinction
between torture and CIDT “depend[s] on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment
applied”).
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diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish acts of private
persons that amount to CIDT.
Generally, States are responsible under international law for the
commission of torture or CIDT when the relevant acts are performed
by or with the consent of public officials. The Convention Against
Torture, for example, provides that a State may be held responsible
for an act of torture if it is inflicted by a public official or by a private
actor at the instigation or with the consent of a public official.37 The
Committee Against Torture has further emphasized that States are
responsible for those persons acting “on behalf of the State, in
conjunction with the State, under its direction or control, or otherwise
under colour of law.”38 The European Court of Human Rights has
held that States are responsible for acts of torture or ill treatment
committed by public officials, even if the official’s superiors claim
not to have knowledge of the conduct.39 States are also responsible
for ill treatment occurring within institutions exercising a public
function, particularly those that exert some form of custody or control
over individuals, such as prisons or detention facilities.40 State
responsibility may even result when these facilities are run by private
actors, if these institutions are responsible for carrying out a
traditional public function.41
States may also bear responsibility for acts of torture or CIDT
committed by private actors if the State does not take adequate steps
to prevent and provide redress for these acts. The European Court,
Committee Against Torture, and Human Rights Committee all require
States parties to enact and enforce adequate legal provisions to protect
individuals from torture or CIDT.42 Criminalizing such acts, while
37. CAT, supra note 18, art. 1(1).
38. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 15.
39. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5310/71, ¶ 159. However, a “State
may avoid liability for Article 3 treatment where there appears to be individual acts of ill
discipline in respect of which the State takes appropriate action. The State must take rigorous
steps to discipline those responsible and adopt measures to ensure there is no repetition of such
actions.” INTERIGHTS, supra note 35, at 48.
40. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 15
(recommending that States take action to prohibit, prevent, and redress torture or CIDT in
prisons, hospitals, schools, military service, institutions that provide care to children, the
elderly, the mentally ill, or the disabled, as well as institutions or contexts “where the failure of
the State to intervene encourages and enhances the danger of privately inflicted harm”).
41. See id. ¶ 17.
42. See, e.g., A v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25599/94, ¶ 24 (1998) (holding that
the English law “did not provide adequate protection to the applicant against treatment or
punishment contrary to Article 3” and recommending that the State amend the law); CAT,
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important, is not generally sufficient;43 States parties must instead
work to ensure that legal provisions are actually effective, including
by investigating and prosecuting alleged acts of torture or CIDT.44 In
particular, States must intervene when officials “know or have
reasonable grounds to believe” that private parties are engaging in
torture or ill treatment,45 otherwise their failure to act may amount to
encouragement or “de facto permission.”46 Overall, these provisions
aim to ensure that the right not to be subjected to CIDT is realized in
practice, not just on paper, and to ensure that victims receive adequate
remedies whether the offending treatment is inflicted by a public or a
private actor.47
Human rights experts like the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture
have also recognized that health care facilities can be sites of
mistreatment that amounts to CIDT, and that women may be
particularly vulnerable to abuse in the healthcare context.48 State
responsibility for such mistreatment may attach directly if the health
supra note 18, art. 2 (requiring States parties to take “effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures” to prevent acts of torture and CIDT within their jurisdiction);
Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 3 (extending the obligation
under CAT Article 2 to CIDT); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20, supra note
13, ¶¶ 2, 8 (noting that legislative, administration, judicial, or “other measures” may be
required to prevent and punish torture or CIDT).
43. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20, supra note 13, ¶ 8.
44. See Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18. Aisling
Reidy, The Prohibition of Torture: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS NO. 6, 40–43 (2002), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRHAND/DG2-EN-HRHAND-06(2003).pdf
(discussing States’ positive obligation under Article 3 to investigate allegations of torture and
ill-treatment).
45. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18; see also Z &
others v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 29392/95 ¶ 73 (2001) (holding that States must
take measures that provide effective protection against ill-treatment of which “the authorities
had or ought to have had knowledge”).
46. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18.
47. Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights arise from the
principle that rights should be “practical and effective,” and from Article 13, which requires
effective remedies for violations of the Convention. See A.R. MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 5
(2004).
48. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: Torture and Ill-Treatment in Health Facilities, U.N. Doc
A/22/53 (Feb. 1, 2013) (describing forms of torture of ill-treatment that have been documented
in healthcare facilities); U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of
Everyone to the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, U.N. Doc.
A/66/254 (Aug. 3, 2011) (describing the rights violations that women suffer when reproductive
healthcare is criminalized).
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care facility is State-run, possibly even if the staff act of their own
initiative rather than under a State policy that condones their
conduct.49 In private health facilities, state responsibility for torture or
CIDT may attach directly if the facility is seen as performing a
traditional State function; otherwise, responsibility may still attach if
the State has not taken adequate steps to prevent, investigate,
prosecute, and punish ill treatment in these facilities, especially when
the State has knowledge that this treatment is likely occurring. In
practice, human rights bodies have relied on these standards to find
States responsible for ill treatment inflicted by doctors and other
actors in both public and private facilities when they deny or obstruct
women’s access to abortion or related healthcare services in certain
serious circumstances. Furthermore, they have recognized that States
may be responsible for women’s suffering under domestic laws that
sharply circumscribe access to abortion. These cases are the focus of
Part II.
II. DENIAL OF ABORTION AND RELATED PROCEDURES AS A
FORM OF CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
The European Court of Human Rights, the Committee Against
Torture, and the Human Rights Committee have all recognized that
denying women access to abortion or obstructing their access to
abortion-related services can in certain circumstances amount to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under international law. In this
Part, I identify two broad circumstances in which these human rights
bodies have recognized that denial of abortion may amount to CIDT:
first, when women are harassed, obstructed, and denied access to
services when attempting to obtain an abortion that is legally
permitted under the State’s domestic law and second, when restrictive
abortion laws themselves compel women to continue with
pregnancies that would have serious and often irrevocable
consequences for the women’s physical or mental health. In the
former situation, human rights bodies have held States responsible for
not putting in place procedural mechanisms that would allow women
to vindicate their rights under domestic law free of harassment. In the
latter, human rights bodies have called on States to reform their
substantive abortion laws and to provide sufficient exceptions for the
life, health, or well-being of the woman. In the following Sections, I
49. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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outline the development of these standards, first by the European
Court of Human Rights and then by UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies.
A. Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Within the “Margin of
Appreciation”: The European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence
on Abortion and CIDT
In the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights (the
“European Court” or the “Court”) has issued four decisions on access
to abortion that have significantly developed its doctrine in this area.
In each case, the applicants argued that their Article 3 right to be free
from inhuman or degrading treatment had been violated because they
had been denied access to or were seriously harassed in their efforts to
obtain an abortion or prenatal genetic testing necessary to qualify for
an abortion. The European Court found Article 3 violations in two
cases where access to abortion or prerequisite health services was
clearly legal in the applicants’ cases, while in the other two cases,
where the applicants did not have a clear right to an abortion under
domestic laws, the Court either found no violation of Article 3 or
concluded that there were no grounds to address the issue.
In this Section, I argue that the different outcomes in these cases
are best explained by the fact that the Court considers abortion issues
primarily under the right to private life enshrined in Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Article 8, as interpreted by
the European Court, grants States what is known as a “margin of
appreciation” for choosing how to regulate abortion, and the
European Court has allowed States broad discretion under this
doctrine to restrict access to abortion. In fact, the European Court has
never held that the substance of a State’s abortion laws violates the
European Convention, and instead has only found that procedural
deficits in enforcing State abortion laws run afoul of Article 8.
Consequently, I argue that the European Court’s Article 8
jurisprudence implicitly circumscribes when and how the Court will
address Article 3 issues in the abortion context. Thus, the relationship
between Article 8 and Article 3 helps to explain why the European
Court has only found that denial of abortion or related services
amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment in cases where women
were denied services to which they were legally entitled.
The European Court’s focus on procedure in these cases could
be interpreted to suggest that the applicants’ pain and suffering arose
primarily from the procedural deficits themselves—meaning, what the
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Court cared about was the humiliation and anguish the women
experienced in being obstructed from accessing a legal right. Such an
interpretation, however, falters upon a careful reading of the Court’s
opinions. As I argue below, these opinions demonstrate a concern
with the suffering that women experience when their reproductive
autonomy is denied and have substantive implications with respect to
the development of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area.
1. No Article 3 Violation: Tysi c v. Poland and A, B, & C v. Ireland
In 2007 and 2010, the European Court decided two cases that
have formed the backbone of its abortion jurisprudence—Tysi c v.
Poland and A, B, & C v. Ireland. While the Court made seminal
findings under Article 8—right to private life—in both cases, it failed
to find an Article 3—right to be free from torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment—violation, despite recognizing that the
applicants experienced pain and suffering when they were denied
access to abortion.
Tysi c v. Poland concerned a Polish woman, Alicja Tysi c, who
was denied an abortion despite the fact that her doctors told her that
continuing the pregnancy could lead to the loss of her eyesight due to
a preexisting health condition. In Poland, abortion is legal if
continuing the pregnancy endangers the woman’s life or health.50
Although multiple doctors acknowledged that continuing the
pregnancy posed a risk to Tysi c’s eyesight, they refused to issue the
certification for the abortion on the basis that the risk to her health
was not certain.51 Tysi c was unable to obtain an abortion. After
giving birth, Tysi c’s eyesight deteriorated rapidly and she was
subsequently declared to be significantly disabled.52 In her application
before the European Court, Tysi c claimed that the Polish State had
unduly interfered with her Article 8 right to private life by failing to
provide her with a legal therapeutic abortion and by failing to provide
a comprehensive legal framework to guarantee her rights.53
Furthermore, Tysi c claimed that the State’s failure to make a legal
50. Tysi c v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5410/03, ¶ 38 (2007) (citing Poland’s 1993 Law
on Family Planning, Section 4a). Abortion is also legal when there is a high risk that the fetus
will be “severely and irreversibly damaged or suffering from an incurable life-threatening
disease” and if there are “strong grounds” to believe that the pregnancy is the result of a
criminal act (e.g., rape). Id.
51. See id. ¶ 9.
52. See id. ¶ 18.
53. See id. ¶ 67.
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abortion possible in circumstances that threatened her health—
essentially forcing her to continue with a pregnancy knowing that her
health could seriously deteriorate—resulted in “anguish and distress”
amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3.54
The European Court found a violation of Article 8 but not of
Article 3. In examining the Article 8 claim, the Court declined to
interpret the European Convention to guarantee access to any specific
medical services as part of the right to private life.55 However, the
Court found that once a State has chosen to make abortion legal in
certain circumstances, it could not “structure its legal framework in a
way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it.”56 Thus, the
Court held that Article 8 required Poland to establish a procedural
framework that would allow women to vindicate their right to a legal
abortion while it was still possible for them to obtain one.57 As the
Court noted, “[c]ompliance with requirements imposed by the rule
of law presupposes that the rules of domestic law must provide a
measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by
public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the
Convention.”58 Thus, while the Court did not find that Tysi c had a
right under Article 8 to obtain a legal abortion, it did find that Article
8 required an effective procedure to determine her eligibility for an
abortion under Polish law.
With regard to Article 3, however, the European Court found
that the “facts alleged did not disclose a breach,” despite Tysi c’s
argument that she had experienced “anguish and distress” knowing
that continuing her pregnancy could lead to the loss of her eyesight.59
The Court dismissed Tysi c’s claim in a brief paragraph that simply
referred to the Court’s “case-law on the notion of ill-treatment and the
circumstances in which the responsibility of a Contracting State may
be engaged . . . by reason of the failure to provide appropriate medical
treatment.”60 The Court cited, without explanation, its decision in
54. Id. ¶ 65.
55. See id. ¶¶ 107–08.
56. Id. ¶ 116.
57. See id. ¶ 121. The procedure must, at least, guarantee a pregnant woman the chance
to be heard in person and to have her views considered; issue written grounds for its decisions;
and act in a timely manner in order to “limit or prevent damage to a woman’s health which
might be occasioned by a late abortion.” Id. ¶ 118.
58. Id. ¶ 112.
59. Id. ¶¶ 65–66.
60. See id. ¶ 66.
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lhan v. Turkey, which concerned a Kurdish man who was severely
beaten by Turkish security forces during the course of his arrest and
who was then denied access to medical services for a significant
period of time after the beatings.61 The lhan case was, in many ways,
a paradigmatic Article 3 violation. It involved physical injuries that
were inflicted by State actors and subsequent failure by the State to
provide the applicant with appropriate medical care while he was in
custody. The reference to lhan suggests that the suffering Tysi c
experienced was too far outside the traditional understanding of
inhuman or degrading treatment to constitute a violation of Poland’s
obligations under Article 3.
The second case, A, B, & C v. Ireland (“ABC” or the “ABC
case”),62 involved three Irish women who traveled to England to
terminate their pregnancies due to Ireland’s restrictive abortions laws.
Abortion is completely prohibited in Ireland except when there is a
“real and substantial” risk to the life of the woman.63 At the time of
the ABC case, however, it was unclear whether this limited exception
had any practical effect since it had no statutory basis, and Irish law
criminalized women who attempted or underwent an illegal
abortion.64 Applicants A and B traveled to England to terminate their
pregnancies due to physical and mental health concerns while C
sought an abortion out of fear that continuing the pregnancy would
threaten her life.65 All three claimed that their right to private life,
including their physical integrity, had been unjustifiably interfered
61. See id. (discussing lhan v. Turkey, No. 22494/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004)).
62. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
63. See Att'y Gen. v. X, [1992], 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.) (recognizing an exception to Ireland’s
prohibition against abortion where there is a “real and substantial” risk to the life of the
woman). Ireland reformed its abortion law in 2013, creating a statutory exception to Ireland’s
prohibition on abortion in cases where the woman’s life is at risk. See Henry McDonald,
Ireland Passes Law Allowing Limited Rights to Abortion, THE GUARDIAN (July 11, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/12/ireland-law-abortion-rights.
Ireland’s
prohibition against abortion stems from Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution, which reads: “The
State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life
of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend
and vindicate that right.” IR. CONST., 1937, Art. 40.3.3.
64. See Daniel Fenwick, The Modern Abortion Jurisprudence under Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 12 MED. L. INT’L 249, 252, nn.12–13 (2013).
65. A sought an abortion for reasons of “health and well-being.” She was a recovering
alcoholic and she feared that her pregnancy would prevent her reunification with her existing
children (at the time in social care) and delay her recovery. B, who was a teenager at the time
of the abortion, initially sought the procedure because she was told that her pregnancy was
likely ectopic and later, when this proved not to be the case, because she did not feel that she
could support a child at that time. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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with by the Irish government’s restrictions on access to abortion.66
Furthermore, they argued that they had experienced inhuman or
degrading treatment in that Ireland’s criminalization of abortion
stigmatized women who sought abortions and undermined their
dignity, while the option of traveling abroad and seeking postabortion care in Ireland—which was legal, was “degrading and a
deliberate affront to their dignity.”67
The European Court ultimately held that only C’s rights had
been violated; and, since abortion was technically legal to save a
woman’s life in Ireland, the Court held, as in Tysi c, that Article 8
obligated Ireland to put in place a mechanism to allow C to vindicate
her right to an abortion under Irish law. The Court, however,
concluded that neither A’s nor B’s right to private life was violated
since, under Article 8, Ireland could permissibly restrict access to
abortion in cases involving physical or mental health concerns.68 With
regard to Article 3, the Court declined to even consider the issue.69
Although the Court acknowledged that it was “physically and
psychologically arduous” for the applicants to travel to England for an
abortion, it concluded that the fact that the women had to travel
abroad for the procedure did not implicate Article 3.70 The Court did
not provide further support for its conclusion.
The European Court’s consideration of the Article 3 issue in
Tysi c and ABC suggested that a woman’s access to abortion was too
far removed from traditional understandings of inhuman or degrading
treatment to be a viable claim. However, shortly after its decision in
ABC, the European Court handed down its decision in R.R. v. Poland,
where it held that the State’s failure to provide the applicant with an
adequate procedure for accessing prenatal genetic testing—a
prerequisite for a legal abortion in Poland—not only amounted to a
violation of the State’s obligations under Article 8, but also amounted
to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3. This decision
provided the first glimpse into when the Court would be willing to
consider access to abortion as an Article 3 issue.
66. See id. ¶ 168; Fenwick, supra note 64, at 20.
67. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 162.
68. See infra notes 104–105 and accompanying text on the Court’s Article 8 analysis
regarding A and B.
69. The Court found that the Article 3 claim was “manifestly ill-founded” under Article
35 §§ 3–4 of the European Convention and thus inadmissible. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No.
25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 163–65.
70. See id. ¶¶ 163–64.
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2. Article 3 Violations: R.R. v. Poland and P & S v. Poland
R.R. concerned a Polish woman (“R.R.”) who was repeatedly
denied access to prenatal genetic testing, presumably because the
doctors she consulted were concerned that she would obtain an
abortion if the tests confirmed a suspected fetal abnormality. R.R. was
eighteen weeks pregnant when her doctor performed an ultrasound
and informed her that it was likely that her fetus was suffering from a
malformation.71 The doctor recommended that R.R. undergo prenatal
genetic testing in order to confirm or dispel his concern.72 Over the
following eight weeks, R.R. visited sixteen doctors, underwent five
sonograms, and was hospitalized twice.73 Still, she was unable to
obtain a referral for the genetic testing. Eventually, R.R. entered a
hospital without a referral, as an emergency patient, and received the
testing.74 R.R. waited two weeks for the test results, which confirmed
that her fetus had Turner syndrome, a rare genetic condition among
females that leads to abnormal development.75 At that point, R.R.
attempted to obtain an abortion under the exception in Polish law for
fetal abnormalities. However, doctors refused, claiming that it was too
late for a legal abortion since the fetus was, by then, viable outside the
mother’s body.76 R.R. was forced to continue with the pregnancy and
gave birth to a daughter with Turner syndrome.
The Court held that Poland was responsible for the violation of
R.R.’s rights under both Article 8 and Article 3 because it did not
ensure R.R. access to a procedural framework to vindicate her legal
right to prenatal genetic testing under Polish law. Drawing on its
holding in Tysi c, the Court concluded that, where domestic law
allows for abortion in cases of fetal malformation, the State has a
positive obligation under Article 8 to ensure that there is “an adequate
legal and procedural framework to guarantee that relevant, full and

71. See R.R. v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶ 12 (2011).
72. See id.
73. See Litigation Briefing Series, R.R. v. Poland, P&S v. Poland, and Z v. Poland,
CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, http://reproductiverights.org/en/rr-v-poland-st-v-polandz-v-poland (last visited May 1, 2014).
74. See R.R. v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶¶ 27–28.
75. See id. ¶ 33. R.R. also claimed that, prior to genetic testing, she had been informed
that her fetus could have Edwards syndrome, which the Court described as “[a] rare genetic
chromosomal syndrome . . . more severe than . . . Down syndrome. Causes mental retardation
and numerous physical defects that often cause an early infant death.” Id. ¶ 16 n.2.
76. See id. ¶ 33.
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reliable information on the foetus’ health is available to pregnant
women.”77
The European Court, however, went farther than it had in Tysi c,
concluding that, in the process of being denied prenatal genetic
testing, R.R. had experienced inhuman or degrading treatment under
Article 3. In its analysis, the Court described the multiple and
senseless delays that R.R. experienced in her attempts to access the
testing.78 Furthermore, the Court noted that the State did not dispute
that the testing was clearly necessary to confirm the initial diagnosis
of fetal impairment, that the diagnostic services were available at all
times, and that R.R. was legally entitled under Polish law to those
services.79 The Court also emphasized that, as a pregnant woman,
R.R. was in a position of great vulnerability and that, due to the
obstruction of her doctors, she was forced for weeks to endure the
anguish of not knowing the health of her fetus or how she and her
family would care for a severely disabled child.80 Ultimately, the
Court noted, R.R. received the results after it was too late to make a
decision to undergo a lawful abortion.81 The Court also concluded
that the treatment R.R. received at the hands of her doctors—who
refused to provide her with accurate information or referrals for the
genetic testing—was humiliating.82 Taking into account R.R.’s legal
right to the testing, her humiliation by the doctors, and her mental
anguish at not being able to make an informed choice about accessing
a legal abortion, the Court found that Poland had violated its
obligations under Article 3.
In 2012, the Court followed R.R. with its decision in P & S v.
Poland, where once again it found that Poland had failed to fulfill its
obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. P & S involved a fourteen-year-old girl (“P”) who was
raped by a classmate and subsequently became pregnant.83 In order to
obtain an abortion, P received a certificate from the District
Prosecutor confirming that the pregnancy was the result of unlawful
sexual intercourse, one of the permitted reasons for abortion under
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. ¶ 200.
See id. ¶ 153.
See id. ¶¶ 153–56, 160.
See id. ¶ 159.
See id.
See id. ¶ 160.
P & S v. Poland, No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 6, 8 (2012).
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Polish law.84 P and her mother (“S”) approached the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and doctors at several hospitals, seeking a referral for
an abortion.85 Their requests were repeatedly refused.86 In the
following days, medical personnel undertook a range of measures to
dissuade P from obtaining an abortion, including invoking
conscientious objection without referring P to another provider,
pressuring P to sign a statement that she did not want an abortion, and
disclosing P’s personal and medical data to the press and the general
public, leading to repeated harassment of P.87 Furthermore, after
concerns were raised that S was pressuring P to have an abortion, P
was temporarily removed from her parents’ custody against her will
and put in a juvenile shelter.88 Ultimately, the Ministry of Health
intervened and assisted P in obtaining an abortion in a hospital 500
kilometers from her home.89 However, P claimed that the abortion
was still carried out in a clandestine manner even though she had met
the legal requirements for an abortion.90 P and S also discovered that
their travel information had been leaked and that the Catholic
Information Agency had posted it online that same day.91
The European Court again held that the State had violated its
obligations under both Articles 3 and 8. In its Article 8 analysis, the
Court emphasized its holdings in Tysi c and R.R., particularly that the
State was obligated to put in place a “procedural framework enabling
a pregnant woman to effectively exercise her right of access to lawful
abortion.”92 Even though the State had ultimately assisted P in
obtaining an abortion, the Court held that this was not sufficient to
fulfill its positive obligations under Article 8, given the delays and
other abuses P faced prior to receiving the procedure.93
In concluding that P had suffered a violation of her rights under
Article 3, the Court emphasized P’s particular vulnerability as both a
minor and a rape victim.94 The Court observed that, despite her
84. See id. ¶ 10.
85. See id. ¶¶ 11–15.
86. See id.
87. See id. ¶¶ 19, 26, 28, 32.
88. See id. ¶¶ 33, 34.
89. See id. ¶ 40.
90. See id. ¶ 41.
91. See id.
92. Id. ¶ 99.
93. See id.
94. Id. ¶ 162 (“In light of [her age and status as a rape victim], the Court has no choice
but to conclude that the first applicant was in a situation of great vulnerability.”).
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vulnerability, P had faced repeated pressure from medical personnel
and others not to undergo an abortion.95 The Court further noted that
P’s information had been released to the public without her or her
parents’ consent and that she had faced serious harassment.
Additionally, the Court highlighted the fact that the authorities had
not only failed to provide P with protection in her vulnerable state,
but had compounded the situation by arresting and placing her in
juvenile detention against her will after she complained about
harassment from anti-abortion activists.96 The Court also expressed
dismay that the authorities had pursued a criminal investigation
against P for unlawful sexual intercourse even though she “should
have been considered to be a victim of sexual abuse.”97 Finally, the
Court found that “[o]n the whole . . . no proper regard was had to
[P’s] vulnerability and young age and her own views and feelings.”98
Given the totality of the circumstances—including her difficulties
obtaining a legal abortion and her detention—the Court held that the
authorities had treated P in a “deplorable manner,” and that her
suffering amounted to a violation of Article 3.99
The Court’s decisions in R.R. and P & S were notable
developments in recognizing the pain and suffering women can
experience when their attempts to access abortion or related health
services are obstructed. In particular, the Court’s decisions
highlighted the pain and suffering that arises when women face
repeated harassment in attempting to obtain abortion services that are
already legally available to them. In the following Section, I argue
that the fact that the European Court has only found Article 3
violations in such cases is in part an outgrowth of the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence under Article 8, which to date has served as an
important guide and possible limit on the development of the Court’s
Article 3 jurisprudence in this area.
3. The Interaction Between Articles 3 and 8 in the European Court’s
Abortion Jurisprudence
Despite the importance of the European Court’s Article 3
findings in R.R. and P & S, the Court’s abortion jurisprudence has
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See id. ¶ 163.
See id. ¶ 164.
Id. ¶ 165.
Id. ¶ 166 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶¶ 168–69.
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primarily developed under the Article 8 right to private life. The
European Court has long recognized that the regulation of abortion
implicates a woman’s right to private life while at the same time
acknowledging that access to abortion may also touch on the State’s
interest in the development of the fetus.100 Thus, the Court has given
States a wide “margin of appreciation”101 under Article 8 to balance a
woman’s interest in obtaining an abortion against other competing
State values such as protecting fetal life.102 Both the now-defunct
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court
have consistently upheld State restrictions on access to abortion,
finding that these restrictions were within the State’s margin of
appreciation to regulate abortion and thus did not violate the right to
private life.103
The Court’s decision in A, B, & C v. Ireland illustrates its
deferential approach to domestic abortion regulations and signals that
the Court will be unwilling to strike down even extremely restrictive
abortion laws as long as some measures are still technically available
to women to safeguard their well-being. In reviewing Ireland’s
abortion regulations, which prohibit abortion even in cases where the
woman’s health or well-being is at stake, the Court concluded that
they did not violate Article 8 because the value that Ireland was
protecting—its asserted interest in fetal life—was legitimate and
within the State’s margin of appreciation to balance against the
woman’s interests.104 At the same time, the Court noted approvingly
that Ireland’s law still allowed women to safeguard their health by
traveling to England for an abortion and then seeking legal postabortion care back in Ireland, though it did not inquire into the
difficulties Irish women may face in accessing these options.105 The
100. See Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, App No. 6959/75,
3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 244, ¶¶ 61 (1976) (finding that Germany’s law restricting access to
abortion law concerned the applicant’s private life but did not unduly interfere with the right
since it allowed abortion in certain situations).
101. See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards,
31 NYU J. INT’L L & POL. 843 (1999). The term “margin of appreciation” does not appear in
the text of the ECHR or in the travaux préparatoires but is a judge-made doctrine applied to
certain Convention rights. Id.
102. Vo v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 53924/00 ¶ 82 (2004) (leaving it up to States to
decide the point at which life in pregnancy begins.)
103. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Brüggemann, App
No. 6959/75, 3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 244.
104. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 222, 237, 241.
105. See id. ¶¶ 239, 241.
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Court left open the question of whether a domestic law that blocked
all access to abortion in cases where the mother’s life, health, or wellbeing were at stake could stand under the margin of appreciation test,
and thus did not foreclose substantive review of other abortion laws in
the future. Yet the decision did showcase an unwillingness on the part
of the Court to strike down even extremely restrictive abortion laws
on substantive grounds.
Instead, the European Court has focused on procedural deficits
that prevent women from accessing services that are legally available
under a State’s own domestic law and the way these deficits impinge
on women’s Article 8 rights. In Tysi c, ABC, R.R., and P & S, the
Court failed to find that the applicants had any substantive right to
access abortion or related health services but did hold that the
respondent States had violated the applicants’ right to private life by
failing to provide them with procedural mechanisms to vindicate
rights granted to them under domestic law. Joanna Erdman has
described this as the “procedural turn” in the European Court’s
abortion jurisprudence, a move that has protected Article 8 interests
against “interference on bad faith, for an improper purpose, or in light
of irrelevant considerations,” but without explicitly defining what
those interests actually are in the abortion context.106
In each of the cases discussed above, Article 8 was the primary
vehicle for finding a violation of the applicants’ human rights while
the Article 3 holdings, at least in R.R. and P & S, served as an
important, but subsidiary finding. Why then did the Court choose to
make Article 3 holdings in R.R. and P & S if Article 8 primarily
determined the outcomes? It is important to note that Tysi c, R.R.,
and P & S all concerned the same set of Polish laws and policies and
that R.R. and P & S highlighted Poland’s failure to effectively
implement the Court’s decision in Tysi c. The Article 3 holdings in
both cases allowed the Court to powerfully reiterate to Poland the
importance of following through on the requirements of the Tysi c
decision. This is not to suggest a purely political motivation on the
part of the Court but a sensible incremental approach: In Tysi c, the
Court considered Article 8 to be sufficient to resolve the issue, which

106. Joanna N. Erdman, The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the European Court of
Human Rights, in ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 121, 137 (Rebecca J.
Cook, Joanna N. Erdman & Bernard M. Dickens eds., 2014).
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was presenting itself to the Court for the first time.107 When the issue
of procedural fairness under Article 8 arose again in R.R. and P & S,
the Court recognized that the Article 8 violation was sufficiently
serious and entrenched to warrant examining the related Article 3
issue more closely.
These cases may also be distinguished in that R.R. and P both
sought medical services that were clearly legal in their circumstances
while the applicants in ABC and Tysi c sought services under
conditions that made the procedure questionably legal, at best. Thus,
the European Court’s opinions in R.R. and P & S could be seen as
recognizing that women who are obstructed in their efforts to obtain
legal and available medical services suffer a particularly acute form of
pain that is more likely to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.
The obstructive acts of health care providers, the State, and other
actors could be seen as particularly harmful and degrading precisely
because the women were only seeking what the State had already
guaranteed to them by law.
At the same time, it would be too simplistic to conclude that
R.R. and P’s pain and suffering stemmed only or even primarily from
the fact that the services they sought were legally available. Instead,
the European Court’s opinions put forward a broader understanding
of the women’s pain and suffering––one stemming from the
frustration of their ability to make important decisions about their
bodies and their futures.108 In R.R., for example, the Court
emphasized the suffering that R.R. experienced when she was not
given the information needed to make crucial choices about the future
of her pregnancy and the well-being of her family, while in P & S, the
Court highlighted that P’s suffering was exacerbated by the fact that
her “own views and feelings” were not taken into account in her
107. Joanna Erdman has argued that the “procedural turn” in the European Court’s
abortion jurisprudence under Article 8 may have emerged as a way to “reengage rather than
alienate the state” in ensuring that rights under the European Convention on Human Rights are
upheld. Id. at 133 (“By turning to positive obligations and to procedural rights—by enlisting
the state and its laws in making rights effective—the European Court works through rather
than against the national legal order.”). Thus, it is plausible that in Tysi c, an early effort by
the Court to engage the Polish State in the protection of Article 8 procedural rights in the
abortion context, the European Court felt that it was not necessary to go further to find a
violation of Article 3 in order to enlist the cooperation of the State in this regard.
108. In both R.R. and P & S, the applicants were clearly entitled to the medical services
they sought; thus, the European Court was able to explore the substantive impact that the
denial of these services had on the applicants without having to make any conclusions with
respect to the substantive obligations enshrined in Article 8 itself.

2015]

(EN)GENDERING SUFFERING

125

attempts to obtain an abortion. The Court’s reasoning in both cases
suggests a substantive concern with the State’s frustration of a
woman’s reproductive autonomy, which moves beyond the
procedural focus of its Article 8 analysis.109
The substantive component of the European Court’s Article 3
reasoning suggests that the Court could eventually find that a State’s
legal restrictions on abortion resulted in the infliction of inhuman or
degrading treatment on a woman seeking access to prohibited
services. Again, however, the Court will likely only find that the
implementation of a State’s substantive abortion law has violated
Article 3 if it also concludes that the law has exceeded the margin of
appreciation under Article 8. In short, an expansion of the Court’s
Article 3 jurisprudence in this area is likely contingent on a shift in its
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine to evaluating State
abortion laws.
B. Pushing the Boundaries of Domestic Law: The Human Rights
Committee and the Committee Against Torture
Like the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights
Committee has recognized that a woman can experience CIDT when
she is faced with harassment that obstructs her access to a legally
available abortion and when she lacks access to an effective
mechanism to vindicate her rights. Additionally, the Human Rights
Committee and the Committee Against Torture have also urged States
to consider revising their restrictive abortion laws or risk inflicting
CIDT on women seeking abortions in cases of rape or serious threat
to a woman’s life or well-being.
1. The UN Human Rights Committee: K.L. v. Peru and L.M.R. v.
Argentina
Beginning in the late 1990s, the UN Human Rights Committee,
through its General Comments and Concluding Observations to
States, expressed its concern that States’ restrictive abortion laws
could run afoul of their obligations to prevent torture or CIDT under
109. This is not to say that the Court’s Article 8 analysis is wholly devoid of concern for
women’s substantive autonomy interests. Erdman argues that the Tysi c opinion did introduce
one substantive norm under Article 8, namely, the right to be heard within procedural
mechanisms governing access to legal abortion. As Erdman noted, “Within a right to be heard
sits a respect for personal autonomy and development, substantive interests associated with the
most liberal of abortion regimes.” Id. at 140.
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Article 7 of the ICCPR, particularly when the pregnancy was the
result of rape or the woman’s life was threatened.110 The Committee
has also used its Concluding Observations to urge States to reform
restrictive abortion laws to ensure their compliance with Article 7.
For example, in its Concluding Observations to Peru in 2013, the
Committee observed that Peru’s criminalization of abortion was
incompatible with its obligations under Article 7 and recommended
that Peru revise its laws to allow abortion in cases of rape or incest.111
Furthermore, in its most recent Concluding Observations to Ireland,
the Committee, citing to Article 7, expressed its concern that Ireland
continued to prohibit abortion in most circumstances and highlighted
the “severe mental suffering caused by the denial of abortion services
to women seeking abortions due to rape, incest, fatal foetal
abnormality or serious risks to health.”112 The Committee concluded
by recommending that Ireland undertake significant reforms, namely
that it “[r]evise its legislation on abortion, including its Constitution,
to provide for additional exceptions in cases of rape, incest, serious
risks to the health of the mother, or fatal foetal abnormality”113 to
comply with its obligations under the ICCPR.114
The Human Rights Committee has further elaborated on its
understanding of the nexus between restrictive abortion laws and
110. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28, supra note 3, ¶ 11
(noting that in assessing a State’s compliance with Article 7 of the ICCPR, the Committee
would examine whether States provided access to safe abortion for women who became
pregnant as a result of rape); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations to Peru, ¶ 20,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/PER (2000) (observing that the criminalization of abortion is
incompatible with Article 7 of the ICCPR and recommending that Peru revise its abortion
law).
111. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations to Peru, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/PER/CO/5 (2013).
112. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations to Ireland, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (2014).
113. Id. ¶ 9(a) (emphasis added).
114. As of this writing, two petitions are pending before the UN Human Rights
Committee on behalf of Irish women who traveled to the United Kingdom to obtain abortion
services after discovering that they were carrying fetuses with fatal anomalies. The petitioners
claim that Ireland’s abortion laws, which make it illegal for women to obtain abortions in cases
of fetal abnormality, violate their right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
under Article 7 of the ICCPR, among other claims. See Press Release, Center for Reproductive
Rights Brings Second Case Against Ireland Abortion Laws to United Nations, CENTER FOR
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (Mar. 13, 2014), available at http://reproductiverights.org/en/pressroom/CRR-brings-second-Ireland-case; Press Release, Irish Woman Forced to Travel Abroad
for Abortion Brings Case to United Nations, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (Nov. 13,
2013), available at http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/irish-woman-forced-to-travelabroad-for-abortion-brings-case-to-united-nations.
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CIDT in two individual communications where it found that denying
or obstructing a woman’s access to an abortion amounted to CIDT:
K.L. v. Peru and L.M.R. v. Argentina.
In K.L. v. Peru, the author of the communication was a 17-yearold girl who was diagnosed as pregnant with an anencephalic fetus, a
rare condition in which the fetus develops without a significant part of
its brain, skull, or scalp. The doctors told K.L. that the fetus would not
survive long after delivery and that she faced risks to her life if she
continued with the pregnancy.115 They advised K.L. to terminate the
pregnancy. However, the hospital director refused to provide K.L.
with the abortion on the grounds that the Peruvian Penal Code
criminalized abortion in cases where the fetus was likely to be born
with a severe deformity and only permitted the procedure when
abortion was the only way to save the life of the pregnant woman or
to avoid “serious or permanent damage to her health.”116 The Ministry
of Health medical personnel also refused K.L.’s request for an
abortion authorization. K.L. subsequently gave birth to a daughter and
nursed her for four days until the baby died.117
The Human Rights Committee found that Peru had violated its
obligations under Article 7 by not allowing K.L. to obtain an abortion.
The Committee noted that K.L. had endured pain and distress from
being forced to carry her pregnancy to term and then witnessing her
daughter’s deformities, all while knowing the child would die shortly
after birth.118 The Committee also accepted K.L.’s assertion that she
had fallen into a deep depression after her delivery as well as a report
from a psychiatrist and member of the Peruvian Medical Association
averring that denying K.L. an abortion had “substantially contributed
to triggering the symptoms of depression” and had severely impacted
K.L.’s mental health.119 The Committee further noted that K.L. was
particularly vulnerable to this suffering since she was a minor.120
Given the early diagnosis of the fetus’s condition, the Committee
concluded that K.L.’s mental suffering was foreseeable and that the

115. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n., K.L. v. Peru, supra note 9, ¶ 2.2.
116. See id. ¶ 2.3.
117. See id. ¶ 2.6.
118. See id. ¶ 6.3.
119. Id. ¶ 2.5.
120. See id. ¶ 6.3. (finding that Peru had violated Articles 2, 17, and 24 of the ICCPR.);
id. ¶ 8 (ordering the State to provide compensation to K.L. and to “take steps to ensure that
similar violations do not occur in the future.”).
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State’s refusal to allow the abortion was the cause of K.L.’s
suffering.121
The K.L. decision—the first international decision to find that
denial of abortion amounted to CIDT122—was particularly notable for
recognizing the severity of the mental suffering K.L. experienced as
the result of carrying a seriously deformed fetus to term and for
placing this suffering at the center of its analysis. Furthermore, the
Human Rights Committee’s Article 7 finding rested on Peru’s failure
to provide K.L. with a therapeutic abortion, without any reference to
the lawfulness of the procedure. In contrast, the Committee accepted
and relied explicitly on K.L.’s claim that she qualified for a legal
abortion in Peru when finding a violation of Article 17—right to
private life.123 The contrast between the Committee’s reasoning under
Article 7 and Article 17 suggests that the Committee understood
K.L.’s suffering as arising from being compelled to continue with her
pregnancy, not from being denied a right recognized under domestic
law. Furthermore, the Committee’s focus on the harm to K.L.’s
mental health implied that Peru was required to either amend its
abortion law or interpret its health exception broadly to include
threats to mental health in order to avoid future inflictions of CIDT on
young women in positions similar to K.L.124
The Human Rights Committee built on K.L. v. Peru when it
decided L.M.R. v. Argentina in 2011. L.M.R. was a young, mentally
disabled girl who became pregnant as a result of rape. Although
Argentine law allows for mentally disabled women who are rape
victims to access abortion,125 L.M.R. faced multiple hurdles to
obtaining an abortion: the first hospital she and her family approached

121. See id. ¶ 6.3.
122. See Luisa Cabal & Jaime M. Todd-Gher, Reframing the Right to Health: Legal
Advocacy to Advance Women’s Reproductive Rights, in REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
120, 128 (Andrew Clapham & Mary Robinson eds., 2012).
123. See Pardiss Kebriaei, UN Human Rights Committee Decision in KL v. Peru, 15
INTERIGHTS BULL. 101, 151–52 (2006), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/
crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Interights_KL_v_Peru.pdf. This suggests that the
Committee’s omission of this detail in its Article 7 analysis was deliberate rather than
inadvertent. See Human Rights Comm., Commc'n., K.L. v. Peru, supra note 9, ¶ 6.4.
124. See Kebriaei, supra note 123.
125. Código Penal [Cód. Pen.] [Criminal Code] art. 86(2) (Abeledo Perrot, Buenos
Aires, 1971) (Arg.); Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 1608/2007, L.M.R. v. Argentina, ¶
2.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 (2011).
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refused to perform the abortion, even though it was legal;126 the
matter was brought before a juvenile court judge who issued an
injunction to prevent the hospital from performing the abortion,
despite the fact that Argentine law does not provide for judicial
intervention in determining whether an abortion is legally
available;127 and even though the judge’s order was eventually
overruled by a higher court,128 multiple hospitals and health centers
still refused to provide the abortion.129 L.M.R. and her family also
faced public pressure not to undergo the abortion, including pressure
from the Catholic University, the Corporation of Catholic Lawyers,
and from the public who sent threatening letters to the hospital where
L.M.R. was seeking medical care.130 Ultimately, L.M.R. obtained a
clandestine abortion, even though the Supreme Court of Justice of
Buenos Aires had ruled that her termination could proceed legally.131
The Human Rights Committee found multiple violations of
L.M.R.’s rights under the ICCPR, including her right to be free from
CIDT under Article 7. The Committee focused on the State’s
procedural omission, noting that it was this omission “in failing to
guarantee L.M.R.’s right to a termination of pregnancy [as provided
under domestic law] . . . [that] caused L.M.R. physical and mental
suffering” amounting to a violation of Article 7.132 Like the European
Court in R.R. and P & S, the Human Rights Committee recognized
that L.M.R. had experienced particularly severe humiliation and pain
from being repeatedly denied access to a legal procedure. The fact
that L.M.R. ultimately had to obtain a clandestine procedure—which
is often less safe than a legal procedure133—may also have
contributed to the finding. The Committee further recognized that
L.M.R.’s vulnerability as a young rape victim with a diminished
126. See Human Rights Comm., Commc'n., K.L. v. Peru, L.M.R. v. Argentina, ¶ 2.2,
supra note 114.
127. See id. ¶ 2.4.
128. See id. ¶ 2.6.
129. See id. ¶¶ 2.7–2.8.
130. See id. ¶¶ 2.7, 2.9.
131. See id. ¶ 2.8.
132. Id. ¶ 9.2.
133. According to the World Health Organization, 47,000 women die from
complications of unsafe abortion each year while deaths due to unsafe abortion make up close
to 13% of all maternal deaths. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNSAFE ABORTION: GLOBAL AND
REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE INCIDENCE OF UNSAFE ABORTION AND ASSOCIATED
MORTALITY IN 2008 1 (6th ed. 2011), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/
9789241501118_eng.pdf?ua=1.
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mental capacity contributed to L.M.R.’s pain and suffering.134
Finally, the Committee recognized that L.M.R. did not have access to
an effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR with respect to
Article 7—CIDT, among other rights; although L.M.R. was
eventually able to obtain an abortion, “to achieve this result, [she] had
to appear before three separate courts, during which period the
pregnancy was prolonged by several weeks, with attendant
consequences for L.M.R.’s health that ultimately led [her] to resort to
illegal abortion.”135 The Committee concluded by calling on
Argentina to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future.136
2. The Committee Against Torture: Concluding Observations on
Access to Abortion
While the Committee Against Torture has not heard an
individual communication on access to abortion under the Convention
Against Torture, it has noted in its Concluding Observations to States
that restrictive abortion laws may lead to suffering tantamount to
CIDT and has urged States to reform their abortion laws as part of
their obligation to prevent CIDT. In its Concluding Observations to
Nicaragua, for example, the Committee noted with concern that
Nicaragua completely prohibits abortion, even in cases of rape, incest,
or a life-threatening pregnancy.137 The Committee noted that when a
woman’s pregnancy is the result of gender-based violence, denying
the woman access to abortion could cause her to constantly relive the
violation against her and would “cause[ ] serious traumatic stress and
a risk of long-lasting psychological problems such as anxiety and
depression.”138 It further acknowledged that, since Nicaragua’s
abortion ban had been implemented, several women had died from
“lack of timely medical intervention to save [their lives], in clear
violation of numerous ethical standards of the medical profession.”139
134. L.M.R., supra note 125, ¶ 9.2.
135. Id. ¶ 9.4.
136. Id. ¶ 11.
137. See Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee Against
Torture: Nicaragua, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/NIC/CO/1 (2009); see also AMNESTY INT’L, THE
TOTAL ABORTION BAN IN NICARAGUA: WOMEN’S LIVES ENDANGERED, MEDICAL
PROFESSIONALS CRIMINALIZED 7–9 (July 2009), available at www.amnestyusa.org/sites/
default/files/pdfs/nicaragua_abortion_ban_report__english.pdf
(discussing
the
legal
framework around abortion in Nicaragua).
138. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations to Nicaragua, supra note 137, ¶
16.
139. Id.
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The Committee urged Nicaragua to reform its abortion law, at least to
provide exceptions in cases where pregnancy was the result of rape or
incest.140 Similarly, in its Concluding Observations to El Salvador,
the Committee noted, that the State’s criminal abortion ban had
resulted in “serious harm to women, including death”141 and urged the
State to take all legal and other measures necessary to prevent,
investigate, and punish “all acts” that endanger the health of women
and girls, including “by providing the required medical treatment.”142
In sum, the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights
Committee, and the Committee Against Torture all recognize that
denying or obstructing a woman’s access to an abortion—in many
cases, compelling her to continue with a pregnancy against her will—
amounts to CIDT in certain contexts. These bodies have looked to a
number of factors in determining whether women have experienced
CIDT, including whether access to abortion is extra-legally obstructed
and the manner in which it is obstructed; whether the woman is
particularly vulnerable to abuse—for example, if she is a minor or a
rape victim; and whether the woman has experienced serious physical
or mental health consequences from continuing with the pregnancy.
In the following Part, I examine these cases and standards further to
distill some common guiding principles that appear to be at work in
human rights bodies’ consideration of when denial of abortion
amounts to CIDT.
III. UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES’ APPROACHES
TO IDENTIFYING CIDT IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT
As described above, human rights bodies have found that both
substantive legal provisions that restrict access to abortion as well as
procedural deficits that obstruct women from accessing legal
reproductive health services can lead to the infliction of pain or
suffering amounting to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. But
while human rights bodies have cited numerous factors to support
these findings, they have not put forward a clear conceptualization of
when the physical or psychological pain experienced by women in
this context crosses the threshold to become CIDT. This issue is
140. See id.
141. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee Against
Torture: El Salvador, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SLV/CO/2 (2009).
142. Id.
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common to the CIDT analysis more generally, which consists
primarily of fact-specific, case-by-case inquiries rather than an
application of bright line rules. At the same time, human rights bodies
have not generally found that denials of other forms of healthcare
amount to CIDT, even when they result in severe pain or suffering,
instead analyzing these issues under other human rights such as the
right to health. Thus, it is important to understand why abortion, in
certain circumstances, is different and what implications this holds for
the protection of women’s human rights in the healthcare context.
A. Human Rights Bodies Appear to Consider the Justifiability or
Proportionality of the State Regulation Restricting Access to Abortion
in Determining Whether the Regulation Inflicts CIDT on a Woman
Denied an Abortion
As discussed in Part I, human rights bodies’ CIDT analysis
focuses primarily on whether the conduct in question meets a
minimum severity threshold. It is not always clear, however, how this
threshold is determined. Some commentators have suggested that the
minimum severity threshold is actually determined, at least in part, by
an examination of whether the infliction of pain or suffering is
justifiable in light of lawful State purposes. If it is justifiable, then it
cannot amount to CIDT, despite the infliction of serious pain or
suffering;143 conversely, if the treatment is not justifiable, then it is
more likely to constitute CIDT.
The former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak,
is a proponent of using a justifiability test to determine whether
conduct meets the threshold for CIDT. Nowak has argued that the
infliction of pain or suffering may be justifiable, and thus not an act of
CIDT, if the action is legal under domestic law, aimed at a lawful
purpose, and not excessive but necessary in the particular
circumstances to achieve any of the State’s lawful purposes.144
143. See Frederick Piggott, Justification Doctrine in the Prohibition on Torture, Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 18 TORTURE 116, 119 (2008). The European Commission
on Human Rights suggested that CIDT is in part defined as treatment that is unjustifiable in a
particular situation. See Greek Case, 12 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R., ¶ 186 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.) (1969).
144. See Manfred Nowak & Elizabeth McArthur, The Distinction Between Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 16 TORTURE 147, 149 (2006). While Nowak applies
this test to the use of police force outside of State custody, he does not limit it to such contexts
but instead proposes it as a general threshold test for determining when conduct amounts to
CIDT. See id.
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Nowak argues that the infliction of severe pain or suffering deserves
particularly strong moral condemnation in contexts of custody or
control where the victim is powerless to resist her imprisoner. Thus,
in those circumstances, the infliction of severe pain or suffering by
the State can never be proportional and always amounts at least to
CIDT, if not torture.145 However, outside of custody, the victim’s
powerlessness is reduced and thus the decision of the State to use or
condone force poses less of a threat to the individual, who now has
the power to resist.146 Given the increased autonomy of the individual
outside of custody, the State has greater latitude to use lawful but
coercive measures against its citizens, within the bounds of the
proportionality analysis. Nowak does, however, qualify his test by
noting that situations of powerlessness may also arise outside of
custody and in such circumstances the proportionality threshold
should not apply to the CIDT determination.147
While human rights bodies do not generally cite Nowak’s
justifiability/proportionality test as part of their CIDT analysis, an
implicit use of this test may help explain why these bodies have found
the denial of abortion to amount to CIDT in some cases, but not in
others. In ABC, for example, the European Court determined that A
and B were denied abortions pursuant to domestic law and that
Ireland’s regulation of abortion was an appropriate and lawful State
function under Article 8 of the European Convention.148
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the restrictions were
burdensome but not excessive since the women were still able to
travel to England to obtain abortions and could seek post-abortion
care at home in Ireland. Therefore, the European Court appears to
have interpreted Ireland’s abortion law to be proportionate and
justifiable, and thus chose not to engage the question of inhuman or
degrading treatment at all.
In K.L. v. Peru, on the other hand, the Human Rights Committee
may have found that the application of Peru’s restrictive abortion law
145. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak, ¶¶ 37–38,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 (Feb. 5, 2010).
146. See id.
147. See id. ¶ 188.
148. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). But it was not clear
that C was denied an abortion pursuant to domestic law since it was possible that she was
legally entitled to an abortion to preserve her life. Thus, the justifiability theory is not fully
explanatory in this case. See id.
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to K.L. exceeded what was necessary to achieve a lawful State
purpose. Presumably, States enact restrictions on abortion in order to
protect what they believe to be the life of the fetus or to show respect
for “life” generally. However, in cases of severe fetal impairment,
where there is little to no chance that the child will survive long after
birth, denying a woman access to an abortion does not seem to
advance either of these State interests. In light of the severe mental
anguish that K.L. experienced in carrying her pregnancy to term,
forcing her to do so seemed extremely disproportionate to the
minimal State interest at stake and thus crossed the threshold into
CIDT.
The use of a justifiability threshold may provide human rights
bodies with greater guidance for understanding when the denial of an
abortion is sufficiently serious to constitute CIDT. The strongest cases
will be those like R.R., P & S, and L.M.R., where public or private
actors unlawfully harass or obstruct a woman’s access to a lawful
abortion or related procedure. Even if certain individuals act lawfully
in declining to provide abortion services or referrals—for example,
under a conscientious objection law, the State’s failure to guarantee
domestically recognized rights is an omission that cannot be seen as
aimed at a lawful purpose and thus violates the second prong of the
justifiability test. Assessment of the third prong—basically,
determining when regulation is excessive to the lawful aim—is less
apparent and returns to difficult but necessary questions about how to
assess the level of pain or suffering that women experience when
denied access to an abortion. To some extent, a categorical approach
may be useful: for example, adopting the view that denying access to
abortion to a rape victim or a woman whose life is at stake is always
excessive to lawful State aims. However, while human rights bodies
have also found that lesser—but still severe—forms of physical and
mental suffering can amount to CIDT in the abortion context, the
justifiability test provides little guidance for determining why State
regulation is excessive in those contexts and to what extent this
doctrine may restrict States’ authority to regulate access to abortion.
The following Sections describe some factors human rights bodies
already consider or should take into account in making that
determination.
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B. Human Rights Bodies Consider Certain Autonomy Deficits in their
CIDT Analysis but Should Examine Autonomy-Based Harms More
Broadly
Human rights bodies may be more likely to find that the denial
of an abortion or related services is excessive to lawful State aims,
and amounts to CIDT, when the pregnancy is the result of a situation
that compromises the woman’s ability to consent to sexual
intercourse. In such cases, the pain or suffering of a woman who is
denied an abortion is perceived as heightened by this “autonomy
deficit.” Human rights bodies have noted the particular vulnerability
of women who are minors, rape victims, or mentally disabled, all
conditions that diminish or eliminate their ability to consent to sex,
and thus the possibility of pregnancy. With regard to minors like
K.L., denying access to a desired abortion may force them to live with
the consequences of an act that they did not fully consent to, inflicting
severe pain or suffering.149 The autonomy deficit with regard to rape
victims may be even starker: women who become pregnant as a result
of rape do not make an autonomous choice to engage in the sex act
that results in pregnancy. Furthermore, human rights bodies
increasingly classify rape as torture,150 suggesting that the pregnancy
itself is the result of a torturous act and that continuing the pregnancy
can compound a woman’s pain and suffering by forcing her to relive
the violence against her.151 Given that such pregnancies may be seen
as the consequence of an act of torture or CIDT—and thus an ongoing
manifestation of those acts152—it is not surprising that the UN Treaty
Monitoring Bodies have urged States to reform their laws to allow for
abortion in cases of rape and the European Court of Human Rights
has stressed that, when abortion is lawful for rape victims, the
procedure must be accessible.

149. But while a person’s status as minor seems to be important for the CIDT analysis,
no human rights body has found that a State must provide a minor with an abortion in any
circumstances simply because she is a minor.
150. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
152. In L.M.R. v. Argentina, for example, the applicants framed L.M.R.’s access to
abortion as a way to mitigate the harm caused by the sexual abuse that led to her pregnancy.
See Lisa M. Kelly, Reckoning with Narratives of Innocent Suffering in Transnational Abortion
Litigation, in ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 303, 317–18 (Rebecca J.
Cook, Joanna N. Erdman & Bernard M. Dickens eds., 2014) (citing L.M.R., supra note 125, ¶
3.1).
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The recognition that it can be cruel to force a woman to continue
with a pregnancy resulting from an autonomy deficit is a significant
development in human rights law. At the same time, as Lisa Kelly has
pointed out, it risks singling out a small category of women as
“deserving” access to abortion due to their own “innocent” role in the
sex act while branding women who choose to have sex as
undeserving of the same access.153 In other words, women who
become pregnant but did not consent to sex may be seen as suffering
due to the shattering of their sexual innocence, not because their
autonomy over their bodies and reproductive futures has been
frustrated or denied. As Kelly points out, the view of who deserves
access to an abortion “risks reinforcing a particular form of sexual
discipline through law”: namely, in the words of Drucilla Cornell, that
“[w]omen who suffered incest and rape did not choose to have sex,
and therefore should not be punished with an unwanted pregnancy;
those who chose to have sex should expect such a punishment.”154
Denying a woman access to an abortion or related health
services also implicates a broad range of autonomy interests,
regardless of whether the woman is a minor, a rape victim, or
mentally incapacitated, which should receive greater consideration in
human rights bodies’ CIDT analysis. Pregnancy poses very real and
particular risks to a woman’s life and health, stemming from the fact
that a woman carries the fetus within her own body. By denying a
woman the opportunity to make decisions about continuing a
pregnancy, particularly when her health is threatened, a State can
impose serious physical consequences on her. This may also result in
severe mental suffering when a woman anticipates a physical harm
from continuing a pregnancy but is prevented from taking medical
steps to address that possibility. Human rights bodies could improve
their CIDT analysis by recognizing that the deprivation of
autonomous choice, coupled with the possibility of serious health
effects from continuing the pregnancy,155 could in turn lead to mental
153. Kelly, Narratives of Innocent Suffering, supra note 152, at 317.
154. Id. (citing DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 81 (1995)).
155. Although this paragraph focuses on potential harm to a woman’s physical health in
cases like Tysi c, our conception of good health should not be confined to the “absence of
disease or infirmity” but should be understood as a “state of complete physical, mental and
social well-being.” See Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as
adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946, signed on July
22, 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health
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pain or suffering on the same level as that experienced by women like
R.R. or K.L. In Tysi c, for example, the European Court may have
found a violation of Article 3 if it had fully considered and recognized
the mental suffering that Tysi c experienced fearing that she could
lose her eyesight if she continued with her pregnancy.
Furthermore, denying a woman autonomy over her body and her
reproduction can have other social consequences that inflict severe
pain and suffering on her. Human rights bodies have already
recognized this type of autonomy-based harm in the reproductive
rights context, in particular with respect to coercive sterilization. In
V.C. v. Slovakia and N.B. v. Slovakia, the European Court of Human
Rights found that sterilizing a woman without her informed consent
amounted to degrading treatment in large part because it interfered
with her autonomy in her reproductive choices.156 The Court noted
that coercive sterilization “was liable to arouse in [the women]
feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority and to entail lasting
suffering,”157 and that the doctors’ interference with the applicants’
ability to have children deprived them of an important life choice,
leading to depression, the deterioration of their personal relationships,
and the loss of status in their communities.158
The abortion context raises similar autonomy interests. While
coercive sterilization may be distinguished from abortion in that it
involves the doctor’s direct bodily intrusion on her patient, this should
be recognized as a relatively minor difference. Although the bodily
intrusion itself is offensive, it is ultimately the fact that the doctor—or
society—has usurped the woman’s reproductive decision-making that
transforms both coercive sterilization and denial of abortion into acts
Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on April 7, 1948. Compelling a woman to
continue with an unwanted pregnancy can have serious health consequences not only with
respect to a woman’s physical well-being but also with respect to her mental health and
socioeconomic welfare. By depriving women of the opportunity to make decisions about their
bodies in a full range of circumstances, States impose consequences on women that may lead
to severe pain and suffering—not only because a woman may suffer physical harm from
continuing the pregnancy but because she may not have the socioeconomic means to bear and
raise a child. These considerations should not be overlooked in human rights bodies’ CIDT
analysis, and deserve further consideration in the relevant literature. I am indebted to Johanna
Fine for these insights.
156. See V.C. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 18968/07, ¶¶ 106–20 (2012); N.B. v.
Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 29518/10, ¶¶ 71–88 (2012).
157. V.C. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 18968/07, ¶ 118; N.B. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct.
H.R. No. 29518/10, ¶ 80.
158. V.C. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 18968/07, ¶ 118; N.B. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct.
H.R. No. 29518/10, ¶ 80.
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that “arouse . . . feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority” in women.
Furthermore, the personal and social consequences that the European
Court identified in the context of coercive sterilization, such as
depression and social isolation, often arise in situations when women
are denied an abortion, perhaps especially in contexts where abortion
is heavily restricted and where attempting to access abortion for any
reason is highly stigmatized.159 By recognizing that restrictive
abortion laws contribute to social conditions that stigmatize and
debase women for seeking an abortion, regardless of the reason,
human rights bodies could significantly strengthen their
understanding of the serious harms women experience in this context
and improve human rights protections for women seeking to exercise
their reproductive autonomy.
C. Human Rights Bodies Have Recognized the Particular Pain
Experienced by Women as Mothers Who Must Confront Their Future
Child’s Potential Suffering
In finding that denial of abortion or related services amounted to
CIDT in specific cases, human rights bodies have repeatedly focused
on the mental suffering of the women concerned, including that
stemming specifically from their status as expectant mothers. The
decisions in both K.L. and R.R. highlighted this particular type of
suffering, at least in part because these were arguments raised by the
applicants themselves.160 The Human Rights Committee and the
European Court, respectively, picked up on both of these arguments,
with the European Court fleshing it out more extensively in its
analysis:
Like any other pregnant woman in her situation, [R.R.] was
deeply distressed by information that the foetus could be affected
with some malformation. It was therefore natural that she wanted
to obtain as much information as possible so as to find out
whether the initial diagnosis was correct, and if so, what was the
exact nature of the ailment. She also wanted to find out about the
options available to her. As a result of the procrastination of the
159. For a case study of how restrictive abortion laws can lead to stigma, discrimination,
and abuse against women seeking abortions, see Forsaken Lives: The Harmful Impact of the
Philippine Criminal Abortion Ban, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (2010), http://
reproductiverights.org/en/forsakenlives.
160. See Human Rights Comm., Commc'n., K.L. v. Peru, supra note 9, ¶¶ 3.4, 6.3; R.R.
v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶ 147 (2011).
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health professionals as described above, she had to endure weeks
of painful uncertainty concerning the health of the foetus, her
own and her family’s future and the prospect of raising a child
suffering from an incurable ailment.161

This passage from the R.R. opinion is notable for strategically
framing R.R. as a mother concerned with the well-being of her
unborn child, and whose pain and anguish arose in part from her
concern for her family and its future, not necessarily from the denial
of her autonomous decision-making. Certainly, the European Court of
Human Rights was concerned with how R.R. herself was treated by
the doctors—finding that they had humiliated her162—but the
narrative of “woman as mother” is particularly strong in this case, as
it is in K.L.163
The narrative of maternal pain or suffering is a fraught one.
Feminist commentators have criticized international bodies for
essentializing women as mothers and homemakers, framing them in
“procreative and heterosexual terms.”164 Other commentators,
however, have asserted that the “woman as mother” narrative might
actually provide a fuller and more contextualized understanding of
women’s lives than a concept of women as “free, independent, [and]
individual,”165 unattached to family or community.166 Thus, the
recognition of maternal pain in the context of CIDT may actually
reveal an important dimension of female pain or suffering. It becomes
problematic, however, if human rights bodies do not also recognize
and address the independent pain or suffering a woman may
experience from being denied the autonomous choice to terminate a
pregnancy. Such a failure risks perpetuating stereotypes within
161. R.R. v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶ 159.
162. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
163. The Human Rights Committee in K.L. v. Peru observed that, “The author also
claims that, owing to the refusal of the medical authorities to carry out the therapeutic
abortion, she had to endure the distress of seeing her daughter’s marked deformities and
knowing that she would die very soon . . . due weight must be given to the author’s
complaints.” K.L., supra note 9, ¶ 6.3.
164. Dianne Otto, A Post-Beijing Reflection on the Limitations and Potential of Human
Rights Discourse for Women, in WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 115, 118
(Kelly Askin & Dorean Koenig eds., 1999); see also EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
supra note 1, at 71–73 (providing an overview of feminist critiques of human rights law as
framing women as primarily mothers and homemakers).
165. Radhika Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity and the
Discourse of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 43, 55 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994).
166. See EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 1, at 73.
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international law about the proper role of women in society rather
than providing a fuller understanding of how different situations
implicate their human rights. This failure may be seen in the
European Court of Human Rights cases: while the Court
acknowledged the pain and suffering that R.R. experienced as an
expectant mother concerned with her child’s well-being, it failed to
recognize the severity of the pain and suffering that Tysi c
experienced when she feared the permanent loss of her eyesight yet
could not obtain an abortion.
CONCLUSION
Human rights bodies’ recognition that State-sanctioned or Statetolerated denials of abortion can amount to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment is an important development in human rights
law; indeed, there do not appear to be many other examples where the
denial of healthcare has been deemed to rise to the level of CIDT
outside of detention contexts. Significantly, human rights bodies have
found that States must take a number of steps to ensure that women
are not subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the
process of seeking reproductive healthcare, particularly abortion.
First, States should ensure that rights guaranteed under domestic law
are practically available and that women can vindicate their rights
through a neutral procedural mechanism that reduces the risk of abuse
in the healthcare system. Second, States that prohibit and criminalize
abortion in most or all circumstances should enact exceptions to allow
for abortion in cases where continuing with the pregnancy poses
severe risks of physical or mental harm to the woman, such as in
cases of rape, fetal abnormalities, or when the woman’s life is at
stake. These findings reflect an understanding that certain restrictions
on abortion—or the State’s failure to act to prevent de facto
restrictions from arising—are unjustifiable and disproportionate to
lawful State aims. Furthermore, they signal a growing recognition by
human rights bodies that deprivations of autonomy in the
reproductive rights context can lead to the kind of pain and suffering
that is unacceptable and intolerable in modern societies. While these
bodies have not embraced a fully developed understanding of the
ways in which depriving women of autonomous decision-making in
the abortion context can implicate CIDT, they have made important
strides and have established a foundation for further development of
this doctrine.

